Corruption: Democracy, Autocracy, and Political Stability by Kanybek Nur-tegin & Hans J. Czap
51
Economic AnAlysis & Policy, Vol. 42 no. 1, mArch 2012
Corruption: Democracy, Autocracy, and  
Political Stability
Kanybek Nur-tegin1
Wilkes Honors College, Florida Atlantic University, 




Hans J. Czap 
University of Michigan–Dearborn, 
FCS 121A, 19000 Hubbard Drive, Dearborn, MI 48126, 
U.S.A. 
(Email: hczap@umd.umich.edu)
Abstract:   The recent empirical literature on corruption has identified a long list of variables that 
correlate significantly with corruption but only five were distinguished by Leamer’s 
Extreme Bounds Analysis as robust to various samples, measures of corruption, and 
regression specifications. Among these five factors that were found to reduce corruption 
are  decades-long  tradition  of  democracy  and  political  stability.  In  today’s  world, 
however, there are many countries that combine one of these two robust determinants of 
corruption with the opposite of the other: politically stable autocracies or newly formed 
and unstable democracies. The central question raised in this paper is: Is it worth, in 
terms of corruption, for a country to trade stability with autocratic rule for political 
freedoms but with transitional instability? We find that the answer to this question is in 
the affirmative – the level of corruption is indeed lower in unstable democracies than in 
stable dictatorships. Our results are robust to various measures of corruption, alternative 
regressor indices, and regression specifications. 
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men 
are almost always bad men…” (Sir John Acton, 18872)
I. InTrOducTIOn
The world in 2010 and 2011 was shaken by an unprecedented wave of mass protests around 
the globe against established and seemingly unshakable authoritarian regimes. reportedly, 
one of the main triggers was rampant corruption. As a result of these uprisings, significant 
1  corresponding author; primary authorship is not established.
2  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_dalberg-Acton,_1st_Baron_Acton.corruPtion: DEmocrAcy, AutocrAcy, AnD PoliticAl stAbility
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political concessions were given in Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Oman, Morocco, Iraq, 
and Bahrain. Libya plunged into civil war, Syria is on the brink of it, and protests still continue 
in Thailand. Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, and Tunisia experienced complete regime changes3, moving 
from autocracies to newly formed democracies. While the regime changes may be welcomed 
by most citizens, there is a cost involved: long-lasting dictatorships provide political and 
economic stability that new democracies initially cannot offer. 
A move from dictatorship to democracy has many benefits for the great majority of a 
country’s population. So it is arguably desirable in general, but perhaps not in every respect. 
A good proportion of citizens in some countries appear to favor a strong authoritarian rule 
over “excessive” political dialogs and freedoms. russian politicians, for example, are used to 
openly defending consolidation of power. russian president dmitry Medvedev told reporters 
in a 2 July 2008 interview that his country requires “a strong executive leader” and that a 
parliamentary method of governance “would mean the death of russia as a country;” he 
further added that “russia must remain a presidential republic for decades or even hundreds 
of years to come in order to stay united.”4 Perhaps even more striking were the results of an 
online poll conducted by the russian Television channel, the Institute of russian History of 
the russian Academy of Sciences, and the Public Opinion Fund, which in an effort to establish 
the public’s opinion on “the most outstanding persona in the history of the nation” ended up 
with preliminary results that placed Joseph Stalin in the lead with 160,000 votes.5 
In  comparing  the  merits  of  democracy  and  autocracy  for  a  country’s  development, 
corruption takes an important place. It is a crippling problem in less developed, and often 
autocratic, countries. However, established democracies are not free from it either. The rigged 
bidding process for the construction of Terminal 2 at Germany’s Frankfurt Airport,6 frequent 
corruption scandals in Italy,7 and the involvement of detroit’s former mayor Kilpatrick in 
illicit transactions are just a few recent examples.8 
The relationship between regime types and corruption has received considerable research 
interest, especially in the recent decades. The majority of theoretical inquiries find that democracy 
lowers corruption in a country. In a typical principal-agent framework, citizens charge public 
officials with a mandate to act in their interests, but are unable to perfectly align incentives 
(Adsera et al, 2003). When information is imperfect, public officials may engage in corrupt 
activities. Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) suggest that regular voting provides a solution 
to this problem through the increase in control. Thus, democratic voting provides incentives 
for public officials to be less corrupt and to even actively fight corruption in order to increase 
their chances for reelection (Persson and Tabellini 2000, chowdury 2004, Treisman 2000). 
3  See  List  of  revolutions  and  rebellions  2010s;  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of  revolutions_and_
rebellions#2010s
4  See AFP news report “Medvedev Eyes ‘rational’ democracy for russia” online at afp.google.com/article/
ALeqM5isdarT_wZ2zTl-1ALq9iqY0cIBrg. 
5  See “Surprisingly Enough, Many russians Still Miss Stalin’s Strong Hand” online at  english.pravda.ru/russia/
history/10-07-2008/105747-stalin-0/.
6  See The Financial Times (July 2, 1996), “German Airport corruption Probe deepens: Five Jailed  and 20 
companies under Investigation” and reuters Business report (September 25, 1996),  “German corruption 
Wave Prompts Action,” as  reported in rose-Ackerman (1999, p.29).
7  See reuters (February 17, 2010), “corruption is surging in Italy, says state auditor.”
8	 See	The New York Times (December	16,	2010),	“Kwame	M.	Kilpatrick.”	KAnybEK nur-tEgin AnD hAns J. czAP
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Gigliolo (1996) and da Silva (2000) further reason that democracies are better in protecting 
the freedom of speech, which, through investigative journalism and public scrutiny, increases 
the cost of corrupt behavior. democracies also bring to power officials who are more likely to 
work in the public’s interest (Zweifel and navia 2000). Moreover, corruption may be lower 
in democratic systems because public officials tend to change more frequently, which creates 
uncertainty about whom to corrupt (Bohara et al. 2004). Lastly, greater civil liberties and a 
more independent judiciary in democracies raise the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures 
(rose-Ackerman 1999, Schwartz 1999, Jamieson 2000, Moran 2001). In addition to these 
direct effects, democracy has indirect ways of reducing corruption. democratic reforms lead 
to higher wages (Goldsmith 1995, rodrik 1999), which has been shown to lower corruption 
by decreasing the incentives for being corrupt (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, Van rijckeghem 
and Weder 2001). 
There is also a great amount of empirical support for theoretical arguments that democratic 
countries have less corruption (see, for example, Bohara et al. 2004, chowdury 2004, Goldsmith 
1999, and Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000). Adsera et al. (2003) find empirical evidence of a 
negative, statistically and economically significant relationship between corruption and a well-
informed electorate. However, some studies, such as Ades and diTella (1999) and Treisman 
(2000), find no significant negative relationship between political rights and corruption. 
According to Serra (2006), a negative relationship appears only when democracy is a decades-
old established tradition. 
neither theoretical nor empirical evidence is unambiguous in supporting a negative 
relationship between democracy and corruption. A number of studies exist that argue that 
democracies are in fact not necessarily better in dealing with corruption. For example, Little 
(1996), Johnston (1997), and della Porta and Vannucci (1999) have argued that democratic 
voting systems may provide incentives for vote-buying or unlawful party financing. Montinola 
and Jackman (2002) show that corruption is actually lower in dictatorships than in partial 
democracies, although once democratization reaches a certain threshold, this relationship 
changes and democratic regimes fare better. This result is supported by Sung (2004), who 
accounts for nonlinearities in the relationship between democracy and corruption. His study 
shows that starting from an authoritarian regime, democratization initially results in greater 
corruption, before it eventually leads to a decline in corruption. Similar findings were established 
by Mohtadi and roe (2003) and rock (2008). 
If there is such an increase in corruption during democratization, it is very likely to be 
related to the instability during the early years of transition from autocracy. As of december 
2011, the situation even in those Arab Spring countries that had full regime changes, such 
as Tunisia,  Egypt,  and  Libya,  remains  unstable. Violence  continues  in  Libya9  and  new 
demonstrations erupted in Egypt.10 The link between political instability and corruption has 
been fairly well-established. According to Leite and Weidman (1999), instability means that 
government officials do not have enough political clout to enact effective anti-corruption 
measures. campante et al. (2009) argue that instability shortens officials’ tenure, which in 
turn is an incentive for increasing the rate of rent extraction. Furthermore, Treisman (2000) 
9  http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html
10  http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/egypt/index.htmlcorruPtion: DEmocrAcy, AutocrAcy, AnD PoliticAl stAbility
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and Persson and Tabellini (1999) suggest that political stability increases the value of building 
a positive reputation and hence leads to less corruption. 
To sum up, the consensus in the literature is that long-established democracies have less 
corrupt governments. The picture is not as clear for countries with newly-acquired democratic 
institutions, however, and corruption there may still be high due to, among other things, political 
instability. In countries with recent or looming regime shakeups, such as Kyrgyzstan, Burma, 
and Middle Eastern countries, an often-heard argument against changes is that new governments 
may not be any better than the stable, albeit repressive, autocracies, especially in terms of 
corruption. Thus, the question raised in this paper is: does this argument have merit? That is, 
how does corruption in new and politically unstable democracies compare to corruption in 
countries with an autocratic but stable government? Before we proceed to the next sections, the 
following remark is in order: we compare unstable democracies to stable dictatorships only in 
terms of corruption. At the same time, despite this narrow focus, we believe that the findings 
in this paper have broader implications as corruption has been shown to affect a number of 
country performance indicators, such as economic growth (see Mauro, 1995). 
II. dATA And ESTIMATIOn
Our goal in this paper is to examine how countries with secure and lasting dictatorships compare, 
in terms of corruption, to countries with relatively recently acquired democratic regimes. 
To do this we place countries along a continuum that increases from the most unstable and 
most democratic regime to the most stable and most authoritarian regime. In order to ensure 
robustness of our approach, we devise five versions of this continuum. 
In the formulas listed below, A stands for concentration of power in the hands of one 
individual (higher scores are associated with more authoritarian regimes). This variable was 
created from the Polity2 variable in the Polity IV dataset of the center for Systemic Peace. The 
duration of the current regime is measured in years and rc  t is an operator that counts regime 
changes. In other words, for every revolution or coup d’état within a specified time period rc  t 
is equal to one for the years during which these regime changes occur. The time period during 
which the number of regime changes is counted covers years 2000 – 2009. 
All formulas multiplicatively interact the variable measuring concentration of power, A, 
with an index of stability. In Formula 1, the index of stability is simply the reciprocal of the 
number of regime changes that took place in a given country. We add “1” to the denominator 
(as well as in formulas 2, 4, and 5) to avoid divisions by zero.
Formula 1   
Formula 2 is identical to Formula 1 with one crucial difference: more recent regime changes 
are given greater weights.
Formula 2   KAnybEK nur-tEgin AnD hAns J. czAP
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The stability index in Formula 3 is simply the duration of the current regime in years.
Formula 3     
The next two formulas are derived by integrating the stability element in Formula 3 into 
formulas 1 and 2.
Formula 4     
Formula 5     
notice that all formulas produce scores that increase both with concentration of power 
and stability of the regime. In other words, newly established democracies will have low 
scores, while entrenched autocracies will have high scores. Further technical details on the 
construction of the indices are provided in Appendix A.
Figure 1 provides a rough visual illustration of how a few selected countries may be 
placed with respect to the stable dictatorship – unstable democracy line using scores based 
on the formulas above.
Figure 1: Selected countries along the Stable dictatorship – 
unstable democracy continuum*
* countries on this graph were placed approximately based on recent actual data.corruPtion: DEmocrAcy, AutocrAcy, AnD PoliticAl stAbility
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High pair-wise correlations of our fairly diverse indices (see summary statistics in Table 
2) shown in Table 1 indicate that they are consistent in describing the underlying relationship 
they are devised to capture.
Table 1: correlation of unstable democracy – Stable dictatorship Indices
Formula 1 Formula 2 Formula 3 Formula 4 Formula 5
Formula 1 1.000
Formula 2 0.984 1.000
Formula 3 0.976 0.983 1.000
Formula 4 0.986 0.999 0.990 1.000
Formula 5 0.977 0.999 0.981 0.998 1.000
Mean 0.984 0.993 0.986 0.994 0.991
The constructed unstable democracy – stable dictatorship index is used as the independent 
variable of interest in the following regression model:
Corri = ß0 + ß1Xi + ß2Zi + εi,  (1)
where Corri is corruption, Xi is one of our indices, and Zi is a vector of other determinants of 
corruption.
data for the dependent variable in equation 1 is periodically collected by a number 
of sources. However, according to Serra (2006), aggregate corruption indices, such as the 
corruption Perceptions Index (cPI) produced by Transparency International and corruption 
scores from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by a World Bank team (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi) are more reliable than simpler indices produced by individual sources. 
Following Serra’s judgment and for robustness, we use both cPI and WGI for 2009 as our 
dependent variable. 
The recent empirical literature provides a long list of significant determinants, some of 
which we include in vector Zi in equation 1. Among the most robust (Serra 2006) are decades-
long tradition of democratic institutions, political instability, GdP per capita, British colonial 
heritage, and mainly Protestant population. We do not explicitly include the first two in our 
analysis because these variables are already used in the composition of our main variable of 
interest. Furthermore, they are highly correlated with our constructed indices. The level of 
economic development, most often proxied by per capita GdP, is virtually always included 
as one of the principal independent variables. For this paper, we have used the average of 
2007 through 2009 GdP per capita based on purchasing power parity obtained from the World 
development Indicators (WdI) database. Most of the data on British colonial heritage was 
taken from Price (2003) with missing values supplemented from cIA World Factbook and 
other sources. La Porta et al. (1999) was our source for assembling the column of observations 
on the percent of population following the Protestant religion.
We continue to pursue robustness by including other regressors found elsewhere in cross-
country analyses to significantly affect corruption. Greater openness to trade was found to 
reduce corruption (see Ades and di Tella 1999, Brunetti and Weder 2003, and Persson et al. KAnybEK nur-tEgin AnD hAns J. czAP
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X1 Index	1 7 6.72 0 21
X2 Index	2 7 7.06 0 21
X3 Index	3 66 61.21 0 189
X4 Index	4 69 70.07 1 210
X5 Index	5 67 71.49 0 210
Dur Duration	of	regime	(years) 17 15.45 0 83
Corr Corruption	(CPI	2009) 3.25 1.41 1.10 9.20
Corr Corruption	(WGI	2009) -0.45 0.73 -1.75 2.26
LnGDPpc Log	GDP	per	capita	in	PPP,	mean	of	
2007-2009 8.22 1.23 5.66 10.77
Protest Protestant	(%	of	population) 7.6 13.52 0.00 66.00
BritCol British	colonial	heritage	(dummy:	1	
if	yes,	0	otherwise) 0.23 0.42 0 1
Trade Imports	+	Exports,	%	of	GDP,	mean	
of	2000-2009 84.21 38.79 0.67 200.46
Lit Literacy	rate	(%) 79.67 20.51 26.18 99.80
LnPop Log	total	population,	2009 16.22 1.45 13.34 21.01
Eng Legal	origin	(dummy:	1	if	English,	0	
otherwise) 0.23 0.42 0 1
Soc Legal	origin	(dummy:	1	if	Socialist,	
0	otherwise) 0.30 0.46 0 1
Fre Legal	origin	(dummy:	1	if	French,	0	
otherwise) 0.45 0.50 0 1
Ger Legal	origin	(dummy:	1	if	German,	0	
otherwise) 0.02 0.13 0 1
ELF1 Ethnolinguistic	fractionalization	
(ELF	1) 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.56
ELF8 Ethnolinguistic	fractionalization	
(ELF	8) 0.43 0.29 0.00 0.98
ELF15 Ethnolinguistic	fractionalization	
(ELF	15) 0.51 0.30 0.00 0.99
-- PolityIV* 2 6.32 -10 10
Total number of observations = 113; CPI ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean); WGI ranges from 
-2.5 to 2.5 with higher number indicating less corruption; EFL(j), which ranges from 0 (very homogenous) to 1 
(highly diverse), is a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization at the j’th level of aggregation constructed by 
desmet et al. (2011). 
* PolityIV is not included directly in the regressions, but was used for constructing our indices. PolityIV scores 
range from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to 10 (fully institutionalized democracy). corruPtion: DEmocrAcy, AutocrAcy, AnD PoliticAl stAbility
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2003). Our trade variable is an average of the sums of WdI imports and exports as percent of 
GdP over 2000-2009. We have taken the average over such a long period of time to account 
for high annual volatility of trade. country size, proxied by total population, has also come up 
as a potentially relevant variable (see Knack and Azfar 2003, and Fisman and Gatti 2002). Our 
country size variable is created by transforming WdI total population data into logarithms. 
Another often-used independent variable is the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
(e.g. Mauro 1995, La Porta et al. 1999, and cerqueti et al. 2009). desmet et al. (2011) have 
developed an advanced method of classifying countries by their ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
(ELF) and produced fifteen ELF indices based on various degrees of linguistic aggregation. 
We chose ELF1, ELF8, and ELF15 – highest, medium, and lowest levels of aggregation, 
respectively – to include in our regressions. It would seem reasonable to assume that countries 
with more educated citizens are more likely to have more accountable bureaucrats (see Persson 
et al. 2003). To investigate this possibility, we include literacy rates in one of our regressions. 
regional factors may also play a role (Treisman 2000). To account for this, we use regional 
dummy variables made available by caselli and coleman (2001), who split the world into 
East Asia, East Europe, Arab, Latin America and caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Other 
Asia. Finally, we follow La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000), and Serra (2006) by including 
dummies for legal origin (English, German, French, Socialist, and Scandinavian) based on the 
La Porta et al. dataset. More details on all variables are given in Table 2: Summary Statistics.
As indicated in Table 2, the number of countries in our final dataset was 113. In addition, 
for ease of interpretation all our indices and both corruption proxies are measured in standard 
deviations from their respective means.
III. rESuLTS
We investigate the relationship described by equation (1) above using the ordinary least squares 
method with White-corrected robust standard errors. The results are reported in Table 3. 
The estimated coefficient on the unstable democracy – stable dictatorship index (in this 
case X1), the main variable of interest, is negative, sizable, and highly significant across various 
specifications of the regression model. It shows that a movement of one standard deviation in 
the index from unstable democracy to stable dictatorship worsens the corruption index (i.e., 
more corruption) by approximately one-sixths of one standard deviation from the mean in 
CPI. It is important to note that other independent variables are consistent with established 
empirical results in the literature. The coefficients on economic development (LnGDPpc) 
and the percent of population following the Protestant religion (Protest) are correct in sign 
and significant across various specifications. While the coefficients on all used measures of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF(j)) coincide in sign, only ELF1 (desmet et al.’s highest 
level of aggregation11) is significant. It indicates, as expected a priori, that countries with 
greater ethnic and linguistic diversity suffer from more corruption. One surprising result in 
Table 3 is that the coefficient on the dummy for former British colonies, which was found to 
be robust in other studies (see Serra 2006), is not significant. 
11  At high levels of aggregation, countries’ ethnolinguistic diversity is evaluated at the level of  language families, 
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To ensure that our results are robust to variations of our index and alternative corruption 
proxies, we ran nine more regressions, with results presented in Table 4. control variables 
include only those factors that were found significant in regressions reported in Table 3. The 
estimated coefficients on our main independent variable across all X(j) – corruption proxy 
combinations is negative, consistent in size, and statistically significant. 
A couple of concerns may initially be raised by readers with regard to using OLS in this 
context. First, one may argue that slope estimates may be biased due to possible endogeneity 
of both our indices and other control variables. Second, since we are interested in comparing 
stable dictatorships to fragile democracies, our dataset excludes the other two categories, namely, 
decades-long democracies and unstable dictatorships. In terms of Figure 1, we keep countries 
that belong to quadrants II and IV and ignore industrialized countries, such as the united States 
and Japan, and countries in the third quadrant, such as Sudan. Our analysis, therefore, may be 
subject to censoring or sample-selection problems. Breen (1996, p. 35) notes that 
“If we think hard enough, we can probably find some sort of selection process underlying any piece 
of social science data. A random sample of the adult population is actually only a random sample 
of those members of the population who are listed in the sampling frame; so if the sampling frame 
is, say, an electoral register, those adults who are not registered cannot be sampled.”
The censoring problem, even if it applies our data, is very difficult to deal with in our case. 
Partly, this is due to the values of the dependent variable associated with dropped observations 
not being censored at one or both ends of the corruption continuum. In fact, even multiple-
threshold censoring models do not apply here since our “unobserved” – or more precisely, 
dropped – data is not censored at clearly specified intervals of the dependent variable, but are 
discarded in a more complex process that involves a multiplicative interaction of two variables. 
In addition, Breen (1996) and Wooldridge (2005) point out that the regressors of the outcome 
equation must be a strict subset of the regressors of the selection equation.12 That is, we have 
to have an exclusion restriction in the selection part of the two-step estimation procedure. An 
exclusion restriction is a variable that affects the probability that an observation will manifest 
itself in the main regression, but does not influence the dependent variable itself in the main 
regression. unfortunately, we were unable to find a variable that influences the probability that 
a country belongs to the subset of stable autocracies and newly established democracies, but 
has no effect on the level of corruption. Finally, it is likely that selection is not exogenously 
determined from the level of corruption, which further complicates the matter by introducing 
simultaneity (see Breen 1996, p. 55).
despite these difficulties with running a full-scale Heckman or maximum likelihood 
estimation for investigation of the possibility of sample selection, it is possible to get some 
insight on the consequences of considering all types of countries, including the originally 
ignored group. We do this by simply representing established dictatorships and unstable 
democracies as dummy variables against the base of the remaining countries, i.e. the combined 
group of countries with established democracies and unstable dictatorships. The results of 
this estimation are presented in Table 5. note that the number of countries in this regression 
is 152, up from 113.
12  See nur-tegin (2008) for more details.corruPtion: DEmocrAcy, AutocrAcy, AnD PoliticAl stAbility
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Both unstable democracy and stable dictatorship dummies are negative and significant, 
which indicates that corruption levels are higher in these countries compared to the base 
group. This is unsurprising because all observations of the base group, with the exception 
of only Bhutan, Mauritania, Egypt, and Sudan, are long-established democracies (see Serra 
2006). More importantly, the coefficient for entrenched autocracies is greater in magnitude 
and more significant than the coefficient for unstable democracies. The absolute value of the 
difference between the two coefficients is equal to 0.1428, which is strikingly close to 0.1469 
– the average of the size of estimated coefficients on the constructed index, X(j), in all nine 
regressions in Table 4 and the slope estimate on X1 in column (9) of Table 3.13 Therefore, the 
results in Table 5 seem to support our main findings in Tables 3 and 4.
Turning to endogeneity, it does not appear to be a serious issue for our main variable of 
interest. First, our index is constructed by multiplicatively combining two variables, autocracy 
and stability, and it is difficult to make a convincing argument that the resulting variable will be 
affected by corruption in any particular direction. Second, even when autocracy and stability are 
taken separately, it is unclear how corruption changes these variables. corruption may sustain 
autocracy by providing financial resources to the ruling elite, or it may undermine autocracy by 
engendering non-ruling but powerful political clans.14 The stability of an autocrat’s regime may 
benefit from corruption by making it more powerful, or corruption may lead to a revolution. 
Third, Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008) reason against endogeneity of their persistent democracy 
variable in the regression on corruption and confirm their judgment using the Hausman test. 
Fourth, and most importantly, our index is lagged and averaged over ten years (2000-2009), 
while the dependent variable is constructed from cPI and WGI scores for the last year, 2009. 
As for the remaining independent variables, the only ones that may give reasons for concerns 
about endogeneity are the level of economic development (lnGDPpc) and openness to trade 
13  columns (4) and (9) in Table 3 are the most comparable columns in terms of the number of  significant 
variables to regressions in Table 3. replacing column (9)’s estimate with column (4)’s  estimate changes the 
average by a very negligible magnitude.
14  E.g., in Kyrgyzstan many of the most prominent opposition leaders have held a top government  position at 
some point in the past and made most of their fortunes while in office.KAnybEK nur-tEgin AnD hAns J. czAP
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(Trade). Both of these variables are lagged and averaged over several years, which should be 
sufficient to avoid problems due to simultaneity given that we are interested in these variables 
only as control variables.
IV. cOncLuSIOn
In this paper, we find strong empirical evidence that democracies, even if they are politically 
unstable, have public officials who are less corrupt than their counterparts in countries with 
authoritarian regimes. This result is robust across various measures that combine the regime 
type with political stability and across different regression specifications. An important 
feature of our study is that we focus only on countries that lie along the stable dictatorship – 
unstable democracy continuum (along the line in Figure 1) and exclude countries with shaky 
autocracies and well-established democratic systems of governance. We do this because 
existing research on corruption in the latter two groups of countries is fairly unambiguous. 
However, to our knowledge, the question about the level of corruption in stable dictatorships 
vis-à-vis unstable democracies has thus far remained unresolved. Our results fill this gap 
and show that the global drive toward more open and better-represented societies should not 
be diminished due to the unfounded fear that the new government will be more corrupt than 
the overthrown autocrats. 
APPEndIx A: dETAILS OF cOnSTrucTInG THE IndEx
(1) We start with PolityIV (Polity2 column in PolityIV dataset), which ranges from -10 (most 
autocratic) to +10 (most democratic) scores that span the time period from 1980 to 2009. 
(2) These Polity scores are transformed into a new variable, which we call Autocracy, by 
subtracting Polity from 11. The strength of autocracy increases as Autocracy goes from 
1 (most democratic) to 21 (most autocratic). This variable is constructed from Polity for 
the last year only, 2009, i.e. not an average of a number of recent years. The averaging 
is not important because most countries have consistent Polity scores for a number of 
recent years.
(3) The variable Durable is the number of years the current regime has been in place. Every 
time a regime change occurs (as a result of a revolution, coup, etc.), the count drops to 
zero. 
  StaDem is a variable, which includes countries that in year 2009 were categorized as Stable 
democracies. A country’s Stadem score is created by taking the average of Autocracy 
scores for this country over the period of 25 years (1985-2009), if this average Autocracy 
score is less than 5 (fairly democratic) and if the regime hasn’t changed over this period 
(i.e. durable doesn’t drop to zero at any point during this period). I.e. these are countries 
that have consistently been democratic for the past 25 or more years. corruPtion: DEmocrAcy, AutocrAcy, AnD PoliticAl stAbility
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35 countries that belong to StaDem were excluded from the main analysis. These countries are: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
(4)  UnstDict1 was created to represent countries that in the year 2009 belonged to the unstable 
dictatorship group. A country’s unstdict1 score was created by taking the average of 
Autocracy scores for this country over the period of 7 years (2003-2009), if this average 
Autocracy score is greater than 17 (fairly dictatorial) and if the current regime’s duration 
has lasted only for the past six years or less (unstable). 
Countries that belong to UnstDict1 were excluded from the main analysis. There are no 
countries in this group.
(5)  UnstDict2 is an alternative index created to represent countries that in year 2009 belonged 
to the unstable dictatorship group. A country’s unstdict2 score was created by taking 
the average of Autocracy scores for this country over the period of 10 years (2000-2009), 
if this average Autocracy score is greater than 15 (fairly dictatorial) and if the current 
regime’s duration has lasted only for the past nine years or less (unstable).
4 countries that belong to UnstDict2 were excluded from the main analysis. These countries 
are: Bhutan, Egypt, Mauritania, and Sudan.
(6)  next, we take the sample of remaining countries (after excluding Stadem and unstdict2) 
and calculate the five indices at year 2009 (i.e. filtering away all other years), as shown 
in Formulas 1-5, for time periods 1992-2009 and 2000-2009. That is in the Short time 
period, durable is truncated at 10, while in the Long it is truncated at 18. Also, the number 
of regime changes are different in the two time periods; rc(Short) ≤ rc(Long).
  note that for the short period (2000-2009) in Formula 3 the variable durable is truncated 
at 9, i.e. nine years max (which actually should have been 10). 
(7) Once we get the raw index scores, we transform them into standard deviations from the 
mean.KAnybEK nur-tEgin AnD hAns J. czAP
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